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Titanic Quarter is situated on former shipbuilding land on the eastern banks
of Belfast’s River Lagan, birthplace to hundreds of ships including the ill-
fated Titanic. Titanic Quarter looks like a typical waterfront redevelopment
project. Stainless steel and glass – the identikit symbols of civic modernity –
dominate the urban landscape. (Fig. 1) For many visitors Titanic Quarter is
synonymous with Belfast. The aggressive rebranding of this post-conflict,
post-industrial city has strong political and economic dimensions. Titanic
Quarter is supposed to alter international perceptions of Northern Ireland
and shift domestic allegiances following the late twentieth-century Troubles.
The ‘new Northern Ireland’ packaged and projected by Titanic Quarter is
nonetheless out of step with social reality in Belfast.1 Neighbouring work-
ing-class communities are subject to economic and cultural marginalization,
something that Titanic Quarter entrenches rather than tackles. (Fig. 2) This
article draws on the oral testimony of East Belfast workers and families with
historic economic and emotional links to the Titanic Quarter site – Queen’s
Island, as they know it – to explore this shift. It foregrounds lived social
experiences rather than deindustrial aesthetics.2 Interdisciplinary methods
are applied to gain a sense of the Titanic struggle over memory currently
taking place in Belfast.
The first section traces the demise of Harland & Wolff shipyard, explain-
ing how deindustrialization equipped Titanic Quarter developers with a
‘pleasingly blank canvas’ to reshape meaning and space in Belfast.3 The
growth of Titanic Quarter relied (and if plans are realized still does) on
shipyard contraction. The rundown of Harland & Wolff spanned from the
1960s until the final wave of mass redundancies around the millennium,
when shipbuilding ceased in Belfast. The contraction of Harland & Wolff
– for many years the most extensive shipyard in Europe – unlocked the land
required for urban redevelopment. The processes of deindustrialization and
urban regeneration are seldom analyzed together, despite their often sym-
biotic relationship. Responding to recent calls for integrated analysis, this
article argues that state and corporate actors, who had a political, economic
and cultural stake in Titanic Quarter redevelopment, willed the demise of
Harland & Wolff.4
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Fig. 1. Titanic Belfast visitor centre, with the Hamilton dry dock in the foreground.
Author’s photo, December 2016.
Fig. 2. Goliath (left) and Samson (extreme right) H&W shipyard cranes. Billboard erected by
Lower Newtownards Road Loyalist groups asserts the legitimacy of Protestant/Loyalist culture,
specifically Orange Order parades. Author’s photo, February 2017.
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The second section examines the nature and purpose of urban regener-
ation in Belfast, from the formation of Laganside Development Corporation
in 1989, to current Titanic Quarter initiatives and plans. Regeneration of
urban space in Belfast was conceived in political as well as economic terms.
The ‘shared space’ agenda at Titanic Quarter, though superficially positive,
is laden with exclusionary class effects. Building on the work of Steven High
and Jackie Clarke, it is argued here that regeneration at Queen’s Island has
accentuated ‘working class invisibility’.5 In Belfast as in other cities grap-
pling with the effects of deindustrialization, cultural rebranding has pushed
‘the problems of urban decline out of sight and out of mind’.6 Communities
that bore the brunt of shipyard deindustrialization now also endure socio-
economic exclusion from Titanic Quarter. By and large, the new apartments
and jobs on offer are beyond the reach of the local working class.
The final section discusses Belfast’s rebranding as ‘Titanic Town’ and the
centrepiece industrial heritage projects at Queen’s Island. Oral history tes-
timony exposes the discontent among ‘stakeholder’ working-class commu-
nities once reliant on shipbuilding, and what they make of ‘their’ history
being used (and selectively reshaped) as heritage. Ex-shipyard workers’ per-
ceptions of the Titanic Belfast visitor centre raise troubling questions about
the purpose of heritage in Belfast and who benefits from the process.
Contentious narratives concerning Harland & Wolff have been systematic-
ally silenced by Titanic Belfast to create what is termed in this article, ‘heri-
tage memory’. Titanic Quarter reflects the state’s preference for post-conflict
reconciliation through forgetting. Nation-building heritage that ‘reassures
and reconciles rather than disturbs and divides’ is the order of the day.7 The
neutrality of heritage offerings, combined with discontent accentuated by
regeneration and gentrification, casts a dark shadow over Titanic Quarter.
‘YOU CAN’T CLOSE HARLANDS’
Shipbuilding emerged as one of Belfast’s staple industrial sectors in the mid
nineteenth century. The extensive area of reclaimed land known as Queen’s
Island, with its deep-water access to the Irish Sea and cheap labour, pro-
vided ideal conditions for industrial growth. Harland & Wolff (H&W),
incorporated in 1861, became the dominant shipbuilding enterprise in the
city: by the turn of the century it was Belfast’s largest single employer and a
key prop supporting Ulster’s export-oriented economy.8 Shipbuilding is a
highly volatile economic sector, prone to significant market fluctuations and
periods of depression. The Northern Ireland Government, created in 1921
following the partition of Ireland, supported the local shipbuilding industry
during times of stress. A strong political impulse underpinned this economic
assistance for H&W. The workforce was overwhelmingly Protestant and
supporters of the Unionist Party that dominated the new state. Shoring-
up H&W reaped electoral dividends for the ruling Unionist Party in Belfast
constituencies, largely neutralizing the threat posed by Northern Ireland
Labour Party candidates.9 The importance of H&W for Unionist political
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support continued, and perhaps intensified, during the era of deindustrial-
ization that coincided with (and was obscured by) the recent Troubles
(1968–98).
Memory in Northern Ireland is a tricky business. Two distinct and
opposing sets of communal social memories and heritages exist. Collective
(or national) memory is elusive. The two sectarian social memories are
dominant, but by no means overpowering. Narratives shaped by other al-
legiances – such as class, gender, race and sexuality – also exist, though they
are relatively subsumed. Post-conflict (1998), the clash between republican-
ism/nationalism and unionism/loyalism has shifted to the arena of culture,
memory and historical legitimacy.10 As a cultural resource, memory pos-
sesses significant power and saliency in contemporary Northern Irish life
and politics. Memory legitimates certain historical narratives and features
prominently in so-called ‘culture wars’.11 In contrast to the successful ‘Irish
culture industry’, post-conflict loyalist identity is projected with far less
confidence and evokes popular derision.12 Contrasting with state-led heri-
tage initiatives such as Titanic Quarter, alternative sites of memory ex-
pressed through murals, plaques and flags are commonplace in loyalist
working-class areas.13 Here too the state is exerting influence by sponsoring
Titanic-themed murals to displace sectarian and paramilitary imagery.14
Sectarianism lies at the core of the Titanic struggle over memory.
Significant tensions exist, roughly following the Catholic/nationalist,
Protestant/unionist contours that form the main cleavage in Ulster politics.
Sectarian discrimination at H&W shipyard – both real and imagined – has
deep historical roots and strong contemporary cultural resonance.
Motivated by a potent mix of political and economic anxiety, expulsions
of Catholic workers from H&W occurred at several points in the company’s
history, most recently in 1970. The 1920 expulsions became the stuff of
Belfast folklore, nowadays reproduced in the narratives of those with no
direct memory or connection to the event. In July 1920, in the wake of severe
sectarian rioting, 7,500 Catholics and socialist Protestants (dubbed ‘rotten
Prods’) were driven from the shipyard.15 Jimmy Mitchell, a shipyard black-
smith, recalled in 2010 the expulsion of five hundred Catholic workers in
July 1970. He expressed regret at not resisting collective pressure: ‘It’s hard
to stand up against the likes of that. Especially when the mob rules, and it
was a mob was going round telling everybody to get out’.16 It is perhaps not
surprising that journalists later detected ‘quite a few chuckles coming from
[nationalist] West Belfast’ when shipbuilding was in its death throes at the
turn of the century.17
H&W remains a contentious historical topic. In 2010, the shipyard was
selected as the proposed subject for a cross-community oral history project
called ‘Voices from the Yard’. Belfast City Council provided funding
and planning discussions continued for five months before ‘the project un-
expectedly ground to a halt’.18 The issue of sectarian discrimination in the
shipyard soured relations between republican and loyalist representatives.
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Incorporating nationalist perspectives made loyalist community leaders fear
that the shipyard – and its predominantly Protestant workforce – would be
portrayed in negative terms. When discussing H&W, Protestants have more
to defend, and more to lose, than republicans. Resolution was reached by
changing the focus of the project ‘from the shipyard to ‘‘Loyalism in the
1970s’’’.19 Paramilitarism was considered a safer subject, where loyalist
memory could be captured on equal terms to republican memory, itself
wedded to armed struggle and implicated in deadly violence.
My interviewees were recruited as part of a comparative project contrast-
ing the impact of ‘aggressive’ state-led deindustrialization in the East
Durham coalfield in the 1980s with the more ‘regulated’ decline at the
Belfast shipyard. Twenty-three interviews were conducted in Belfast with
twenty-seven individuals in a mixture of single narrator and group inter-
views. All narrators were formerly (and, in one case, currently) connected to
H&W, ranging from management to manual trades. All interviewees were
Protestant and twenty-three were male, reflecting the majority workforce
composition. Nationalist shipyard perspectives were gleaned from news-
papers and from three interviews stored at the Du´chas oral history archive
in West Belfast.20 Oral history in Northern Ireland is difficult because re-
membering can be dangerous. A powerful ‘instinct to say nothing’ is the
legacy of the Troubles.21 To find willing participants proved troublesome,
but ‘a refusal’, writes Anna Sheftel, ‘is not nothing. It is, itself, a story’.22
Paramilitaries maintain an active presence in post-conflict Belfast. Fears of
repercussion and reprisal – and of words being twisted, removed from con-
text and used as weapon – preclude more enthusiastic engagement with
research projects, including my own. Trust was established incrementally
and in some cases the dividend was interview consent. Some narrators
were uneasy when confronted with printed versions of their testimony ‘in
the raw’ and carefully scrutinized their words.23 Others deleted risky sec-
tions, retrospectively opted for anonymity, or requested destruction of the
transcript after PhD submission. Pseudonyms have been used for some nar-
rators quoted in this article at their request.
H&W retained its Protestant character throughout the Troubles. Catholic
recruitment and retention did not increase, even after the introduction of
Fair Employment legislation in the 1970s.24 The perception that H&W was
not a safe working environment for Catholics acted as a deterrent. Shipyard
trade unions also supported and sustained sectarian gatekeeping mechan-
isms ‘based around residence, family tradition and local informal net-
works’.25 It should be emphasized that the sectarian element was not
absolute. Nor was it unique to Northern Ireland, as it also featured in
Glasgow and Liverpool labour markets.26 Close trade-union control over
recruitment ensured Protestant over-representation in Belfast’s engineering
industries. Deindustrialization and the shrinking availability of industrial
employment served to intensify sectarian gatekeeping practices. Some ex-
H&W interviewees historicized shipyard sectarianism as something that
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‘happen[ed] in the [nineteen] twenties’ and downplayed, or failed to recall,
more recent incidents – such as the 1994 murder of a Catholic electrician.27
Off the record, and over the phone, respondents were more candid about
sectarianism (though strenuously denying their own involvement) and
seemed torn between expressing pride in their job, and acknowledging
darker issues at H&W.
In common with other UK (and, indeed, Western European) shipbuilders,
H&W struggled against Far Eastern competition from the 1960s. H&W’s
perilous financial position required constant state financial intervention
from 1966 to keep the liquidators at bay. Formal state ownership came in
1975, part of a wider British (Labour) Government strategy to nationalize
the shipbuilding and aerospace sectors. H&W was excluded from the British
Shipbuilders Corporation, created in 1977 to provide the industry ‘with a
decent burial’.28 Recently released state papers reveal the carefully stage-man-
aged nature of deindustrialization in Northern Ireland, which was tied to
political and security considerations. The shock contraction policies imposed
on other nationalized ‘sunset industries’ were not feasible at H&W.29
Although the Troubles acted as a brake on shipyard rundown, political anxi-
eties failed to bring the process to a complete halt. Deindustrialization
advanced at a pace calculated to minimize confrontation.
The process and social memory of shipyard deindustrialization in
Belfast is highly unusual. The shipyard was an important tool in the con-
flict, and was invested with varying meanings by different actors. For the
British Government maintaining industrial employment was ‘part of an
overarching counter-insurgency strategy’ and important for depicting com-
mercial normality in Northern Ireland.30 ‘The fear is’, wrote an Irish Times
journalist in 1976, that ‘rather than join the dole queues, they [redundant
shipyard workers] will join such loyalist private armies as the Ulster
Defence Association.’31 Protestants equated British shipyard support ‘as
a bulwark to the maintenance of the Union [of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland]’.32 Working-class loyalists perceived rumblings about closure
as ‘an act of betrayal by Her Majesty’s Government and a further step
towards [British] withdrawal from the Province’.33 Nationalists viewed
the shipyard as a bastion of unionist hegemony and evidence of British
economic partiality, favouring the Protestant community.34 One national-
ist commentator described H&W as ‘a great bubbling mass of bigotry,
and those gates are marked ‘‘No Fenians Here’’’.35 Considering the
vexed symbolism of Belfast shipbuilding, its choice as the cultural icon
for post-conflict reconciliation is striking. The Titanic’s short lifespan
(1911–12) allows redevelopers to intentionally elide difficult legacy
issues, notably unsolved constitutional questions violently contested at
the time of the ship’s construction.36
British political tolerance was stretched during the 1980s, when the
economic agenda of the Thatcher Government clashed with peace-building
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priorities in Northern Ireland. As early as 1982, the Government was con-
vinced that
There are no economic or commercial reasons for giving H&W the
further Government support necessary to keep it open. . . [but] the high
and increasing rate of unemployment in Northern Ireland and the ship-
yard’s symbolic importance to the Protestant community justify further
support.37
The Government was keen to divest itself of the ‘grotesquely subsidized’
H&W – but not at any cost.38 Gradual financial strangulation ‘without
it becoming known publicly. . . and looking forward to the day when the
political and economic situation in Northern Ireland may permit H&W’s
closure’ was the adopted course of action.39 In practice, this meant gradual
rationalization of facilities and slimming down the workforce. For political
purposes, it was important for the British Government to portray this slow
death as one directed by the H&W Board and ‘market forces’, rather than
‘deliberate government policy’.40 In employment terms, the policy was a
success. The workforce dwindled from 7,500 in 1980 to 2,400 by 1989,
with limited protest and negligible political repercussions.
Tom King, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, advocated complete
shutdown in early 1988. The Northern Ireland Office even went as far as to
draft press statements announcing closure.41 Privatization enabled the state
to extricate itself from H&W. A management-employee consortium joined
forces with Norwegian shipping magnate Fred Olsen and bought the ship-
yard as a going concern in September 1989. Short-term contracts and out-
sourcing labour to external firms became the norm, as the Olsen-owned
H&W diversified away from shipbuilding into offshore construction.
Covert subsidy – and financial losses – continued throughout the 1990s.
Completion of the last ships, and the final waves of mass redundancies,
occurred between 2000 and 2002. In December 2018 H&W was listed for
sale by Fred Olsen, sparking renewed fears about the long-term future of the
yard and its remaining 150 workers. Warnings against a ‘plunder’ of indus-
trial land by property developers quickly appeared in the local press.42 The
full implications of the sell-off remain to be seen.
The context in which deindustrialization occurred affects how narratives
of job loss are shaped in social memory. The temporal proximity of recent
shipyard redundancies, infrastructure demolition and the growth of Titanic
Quarter has resulted in strong connections between memories of job loss and
perceptions of urban regeneration. Many shipyard workers feel that they
lost their jobs because of Titanic Quarter, and draw direct links between
privatization, redundancy and regeneration. Put succinctly by one ex-
welder, ‘he [Fred Olsen] seen seven square miles of real estate, and they
[the British Government] give him it for a song and he run the place
down’.43 Some ex-employees believe that Olsen deliberately contrived to
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make the shipyard uneconomical, in order to pay off workers and profit
from regeneration. Former draughtsman Brian Lister, reflecting on H&W’s
struggles to secure orders in the early 2000s, said: ‘I would be cynical – I’ll
tell you how cynical. A colleague of mine said: ‘‘You couldn’t get Harlands
to be as bad as it was unless you were trying’’’.44
H&W’s continued existence – writ large by two listed yellow gantries – is
problematic. Seldom used but still operational, Samson and Goliath have
been co-opted as symbols of Belfast’s cultural reimagining and are marketed
as tourist attractions in their own right.45 Shipbuilding may have ceased in
Belfast, but the company indelibly linked with the industry remains active as
a structural engineering and ship repair firm. Titanic Quarter historicizes an
industry that is still extant, provoking disquiet at H&W. According to one
current employee:
It’s not good for our commercial side of things. . . My son was home from
university one time and had a group of his friends on the tour, and the
guy started and was doing the whole thing driving past the shipyard
‘Which is closed now and it’s not working any more, and it’s shut’.
And my son shouted in a loud voice: ‘That’s funny, because my
mummy goes to work there every day!’46
The tensions between heritage and living industry are readily apparent. The
success of the former relies on the discursive eclipse of the latter. ‘Pastness’ is
the marketable commodity at the heart of heritage projects; ‘predicated’,
argues Jackie Clarke, ‘on a not unproblematic assumption that the industrial
world is dead and gone’.47 The coherence of industrial heritage is instantly
problematized when the past continues to challenge or haunt the present.
Social memories attached to H&W are of crucial importance for under-
standing the tone and character of Titanic Quarter, and East Belfast percep-
tions of the enterprise. Landscape change and new cultural narratives have
hidden, but not erased, contested social memories of Belfast shipbuilding.
Deindustrialization and urban regeneration are often umbilically linked. To
rework Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison’s well-worn maxim about de-
industrialization, regeneration ‘does not just happen’.48 It is the outcome of
deeply rooted structural economic shifts, driven by corporate and state actors,
and laden with the social memory baggage of those with lived experience of
the process. Tracing the slow demise of H&W provides a much more rounded
picture of the forces at play, and the reasons behind Titanic Quarter’s narrow
focus. In academic analysis, there is a pressing need to re-connect the symbi-
otic processes of deindustrialization and urban transformation.
URBAN REGENERATION IN BELFAST:
BUILDING ‘TITANIC TOWN’
The Troubles delayed Belfast’s urban reimagining and deeply affected its
character. Belfast’s choice of civic symbol and place marketing is unusually
Titanic Struggle 231
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/hw
j/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/hw
j/dbz003/5364617 by guest on 18 D
ecem
ber 2019
reductionist. For the contested shipbuilding industry as a whole to be turned
into the post-conflict, post-industrial civic icon posed substantial risks. One
ship, one narrow slice of time, and one carefully controlled narrative created
sufficient safe space to conjure the image of the ‘new Northern Ireland’,
outside of sectarian divisions. This section discusses how Titanic Quarter
was constructed, in a material and cultural sense.
In the early 2000s, Queen’s Island was trapped in a curious limbo. The
end of the shipbuilding era was reinforced by widespread demolition, but
post-industrial economic regeneration seemed distant. Deindustrialization
provided both the stimulus and inspiration for many urban areas to ‘re-
brand as places to be consumed’ and to reshape civic identity.49 A strange
paradox is usually evident. Municipal leaders, on the one hand, are keen to
consign the industrial era to history and emphasize the forward-looking
character of the city.50 They also tend to utilize its historical (usually indus-
trial) cultural imagery as the raw materials for civic renewal, and discur-
sively to reproduce what has been torn down.51 Liverpool, for instance,
draws cultural inspiration from maritime trade; Sheffield from steelmaking
and, most recently, Belfast from the Titanic. The result, argues Steven Miles,
is that ‘place marketeers often end up using a universal vocabulary that robs
a place of its individuality’.52
Titanic is a global story, in no short measure due to James Cameron’s
hugely popular 1997 film. Millions of people are aware, even tangentially,
of the basic narrative of the unsinkable ship and the human disaster that
unfolded in the icy North Atlantic in April 1912.53 Titanic is commercially
lucrative. As the birthplace of the ill-fated liner, Belfast possesses a unique
link. Visit Belfast, the council-sponsored tourist information bureau, strongly
emphasizes this authenticity: ‘Only in Belfast can you trace the Titanic story to
its source, discover the passion and pride of those who designed and built her
and relive the excitement of the Titanic erawhen the citywas at the height of its
powers’.54 The cultural power of the Titanic also offers important political
opportunities in Northern Ireland. The ship has been simultaneously por-
trayed as both distinct from – yet enmeshed in – Belfast’s controversial ship-
building industry. The Titanic’s short lifespan provides useful cover for a
narrow chronology (1911–12), which skirts around troubling historical
issues at the shipyard. Redevelopment often involves a degree of historical
‘amnesia’, argues geographer Mike Crang, ‘in order to ‘‘market’’ it’.55
Titanic-themed regeneration in Belfast is a stark example.
Titanic Quarter is nakedly political, by striving to be apolitical. In
Northern Ireland, polarization along ethno-sectarian lines remains firmly
entrenched, reified by demarcation of symbols and urban space. ‘Belfast’,
laments Titanic Quarter publicity literature, ‘is a divided city. The city is to
all intents and purposes segregated, with eighty per cent of the population
living in sectarian neighbourhoods. Titanic Quarter, like Laganside before
it, offers politically neutral neighbourhoods.’56 In a divided society like
Northern Ireland, providing an environment for cross-community
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residential and recreational space is difficult to fault. But Titanic Quarter is
nevertheless problematic in that the people who live, work and play there –
tourists and the middle class – are not the core demographic that most
require such civic spaces. Belfast’s working-class districts still exhibit insular
tendencies, some twenty years after the Good Friday Agreement. Peace
walls which physically segregate Catholic and Protestant districts are still
a feature of many communities. Working-class community shared space is
elusive.
Creating shared space has been a government aim for thirty years.57
Laganside Development Corporation (LDC) mirrored the ambitions of
other urban development corporations established in Britain during the
1980s.58 LDC aimed ‘to transform not just the environment of a large
part of the city but the international perception of Belfast itself’.59 Unlike,
for example, Trafford (Manchester) and London Docklands corporations,
LDC had the added burden of twenty years of communal strife and asso-
ciated negative publicity with which to contend. As acknowledged by LDC,
‘Belfast is no ordinary place in which to undertake urban regeneration, and
yet making Belfast an ordinary modern compact capital city was part of the
task’.60 Stressing Belfast’s ordinariness became a foundational aim. Urban
beautification and economic regeneration could erase the stain of the
Troubles and allow Belfast to flourish as merely ‘another’ UK city.
LDC was wound-up in 2007, having regenerated two miles of riverside
land creeping up to the southern flank of Queen’s Island, where the Odyssey
arena stands. Queen’s Island regeneration plans had been in existence since
the mid 1990s. Despite owning a working shipyard on the site, Fred Olsen
took a keen interest in the redevelopment of Queen’s Island: a process that
would usher his shipyard out of existence. In my interviews, several ex-
workers spoke of their alarm at seeing publicly displayed scale models of
future regeneration which showed no trace of the shipyard. Such was the
workforce furore that the Belfast Harbour Commissioners ‘had to go over
and like drape it [the model] with cloths or something to hide what they were
perceiving was going to happen in the future’.61 H&W was literally being
wiped off the map.
Against a backdrop of 2,000 shipyard redundancies and mass demolition
of facilities, around the millennium Dublin-based Harcourt Developments
emerged as the lead developer at Titanic Quarter. Tellingly, in 2002, the
company’s Chief Executive ‘declined to speculate. . . on the future of the
150 year old shipyard within the new development, but insisted that
Titanic Quarter was not benefiting from the demise of Harland &
Wolff’.62 Land transactions at the time suggest otherwise. Fred Olsen cre-
ated real-estate holding company Ivywood Properties, and sold leaseholds
for parcels of Queen’s Island (owned by Belfast Harbour Commissioners) to
Harcourt Developments.63 In my oral history interviews, the phrase ‘land
grab’ featured prominently. ‘Olsen’, argued ex-plater Harry McFarland,
‘wasn’t interested in the yard. He was interested in the Titanic Quarter.’64
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A ‘regeneration frontier’ is evident, roughly demarcated by the Belfast-
Bangor railway line.65 The eastern edge of Titanic Quarter sits alongside the
Lower Newtownards Road, one of the most economically deprived wards in
Northern Ireland. Economic inactivity in Belfast is the highest of any major
city in the UK, and average weekly wages are the lowest.66 Steven High has
described the process of deindustrialization and urban regeneration as a
‘one-two punch’ – the first punch being job loss, the second being a com-
bination of social cleansing and economic marginalization as deindustrial
sites are gentrified.67 This has occurred at Titanic Quarter to the extent that
it creates exclusion, in a class sense, as much as H&W did in a sectarian
sense. Despite the boosterism of redevelopers, Titanic Quarter has delivered
only limited economic improvement for neighbouring working-class com-
munities. Some commentators have argued that the benefits simply do not
exist.68
Continued economic deprivation is perhaps the strongest factor in aca-
demic ambivalence towards Titanic Quarter. John Bronte has argued that
regeneration ‘has placed a veneer upon reality, extending the gap between
the official packaging of Belfast and the lived reality of the majority of the
city’s inhabitants’.69 Bree Hocking suggests that Titanic Quarter has merely
‘paper[ed] over. . .the economic realities of deindustrialization’.70 In particu-
lar, there is widespread anger that working-class jobs stripped away by the
demise of H&W were not replaced. East Belfast community groups formed
‘Titanic Watch’ in 2007 amid growing concern that Titanic Quarter ‘will not
be integrated with the local community or create opportunities for local
people’.71 Their predictions appear to have materialized. One ex-shipyard
worker stated: ‘To be honest with you, the ones that own it, I think, are
more interested in getting rent off flats, and science park, things like that
there. . .they’re going to turn it just into a residential area, and turn the dock
into a yacht marina. Where does that give jobs?’72 Inner East Belfast has seen
few knock-on benefits from the thousands of visitors who flock to Titanic
Quarter. Interviewed by Graham Dawson, one Lower Newtownards Road
shopkeeper complained that ‘tourist buses go about here, they slow down at
the murals, click click click click click, but they don’t stop’.73
Deindustrialization has a ‘half-life’.74 Like many deindustrializing areas,
in East Belfast there is a time-lag between deindustrialization as an eco-
nomic process, and cultural acknowledgement of changed circumstances.
Conducting research among young Protestant men in the early 2000s,
Anne Green and her colleagues noted that ‘many still hoped to follow the
career paths that were open a generation ago but which had since been
closed’.75 Young working-class Protestants retain a strong work ethic and
possess career plans – but these, in an era of fewer industrial jobs, often fall
short of the hopes entrenched by historic cultural expectations.76 Put simply,
some young Protestant men ‘are left clinging, sometimes desperately, to
traditional and out-dated notions of ‘‘doing masculinity’’’.77 A related,
and worrying, legacy is the ‘long-term undervaluing of educational
History Workshop Journal234
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/hw
j/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/hw
j/dbz003/5364617 by guest on 18 D
ecem
ber 2019
achievement’.78 Relatively easy access to industrial jobs, so the argument
goes, resulted in working-class Protestant ambivalence towards education
compared with Catholics. Whilst this argument is taken too far by some
commentators, it is clear that working-class Protestant educational under-
achievement has persisted.79 Four out of the five lowest-achieving wards in
Northern Ireland are Protestant.80 Although Catholic working-class dis-
tricts remain top of unemployment league tables, the gap with Protestants
has narrowed. ‘Equity of immiseration’ between working-class Protestants
and Catholics is emerging.81 A sense of despair, evident in oral testimony,
gives credence to the view that working-class Protestants ‘are now being put
to the bottom of the heap’.82
Titanic Quarter itself is far from cohesive, nor is it completed. Scattered
listed buildings, new office spaces, apartments, brownfield land and light
industrial units preclude any sense of a ‘connected landscape’.83
Regeneration is work in progress. If redevelopment plans are to be fully
realized, H&W must cease trading. The building dock – an integral part of
H&W’s current operations – features prominently in artist’s impressions as a
leisure boat marina. The company is being erased from imagined future
landscapes. Despite widespread demolition and regeneration activity, at-
tachment to deindustrial space and place remains strong among ex-shipyard
workers. Landscapes are ‘texts’ that can be read differently by social
actors.84 Queen’s Island is a ‘storehouse of memory’.85 Ex-H&W shop stew-
ard Jackie Pollock described how: ‘when anybody goes down that hasn’t
been down in ten years – I’ve seen grown men cry when they go back down,
they just see barren land, an odd hotel here and there’.86 Fred Hoskins, who
worked at H&W between 1979 and 1996, said: ‘I still to this day go down,
you know, like a moth to a flame? If I’m passing – I’ll go in, you know? Just
to see what it’s like’.87 ‘Naming’, writes Derek Alderman, ‘can be used as a
tool of control, a means of inscribing and reifying certain cultural and pol-
itical ideologies’.88 For ex-H&W workers, it is still Queen’s Island, replete
with a ‘time-thickened’ identity – not Titanic Quarter.89 Refusal to adopt the
Titanic Quarter name is an act of resistance against hegemonic power. As
Denis Byrne argues, ‘no amount of official surveillance or suppression can
control meanings people give to places’.90
TITANIC STRUGGLE: MEMORY AND HERITAGE
AT QUEEN’S ISLAND
Titanic Quarter is not short of academic critics. The assessments of histor-
ians, geographers, architects, industrial archaeologists and sociologists have
ranged from disapproval to outright hostility and condemnation. For those
versed in heritage studies, familiar themes emerge. Questions abound about
the use and abuse of history, commercialization, lack of local democratic
accountability and the disparity between past ‘reality’ and manufactured
heritage atmosphere. But academic assessments, to date, have not explored
local social memory. In contrast, by applying oral history techniques, it is
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possible to expose the extent of memory- and myth-making at Titanic
Quarter. The narrative of Belfast shipbuilding articulated at Titanic
Belfast stands awkwardly askew with the memories of those with direct
experience of H&W. The result has been a profoundly critical reaction (or
‘heritage dissonance’ to adopt the framework used by Gregory Ashworth
and colleagues) from the very communities Titanic Belfast purports to re-
flect.91 A struggle over memory, symbols and space is taking place.
Public history and heritage studies is a burgeoning research field, the
development of which can be traced to the 1980s and the ‘somewhat
cranky’ assessments by critics such as Robert Hewison.92 The creation of
any heritage ‘potentially disinherits’.93 Co-opting history and memory, and
transforming it into heritage, involves ‘treading on someone’s dreams and
memories’.94 Every heritage enterprise, be it state-engineered, or grassroots
volunteer-led, creates critics hostile to the tone, character and direction.95
Heritage is also actively contested by visiting publics, who are not passive
receivers of history. Interpretation is not completed by the installation of
display galleries, but subject to an ongoing process of co-creation, rejection
and reshaping.96 Titanic Belfast, nonetheless, stands out in terms of the
extent and intensity of the rejection.
Reluctantly, conscious of yet more labels fogging up memory studies,
I want to introduce the concept of ‘heritage memory’ to explain processes
underway at Titanic Quarter. ‘Heritage memory’ reflects the selective and
future-facing impulse of heritage, as a locus of unifying ‘invented traditions’
and resources to reshape public consciousness.97 ‘Heritage memory’ is as
much about reception as projection. Memory work with visiting publics ex-
poses the tension between what is delivered, and what is remembered and
accepted. Against a backdrop of Troubles-era antagonism, the usefulness of
creating – and embedding – shared ‘heritage memory’ for political elites in
Northern Ireland becomes clear. Titanic Quarter is an intrinsic component of
the wider, post-conflict, ‘attempt to build consensus and thus ‘‘thin’’ narra-
tives of the past’.98 This section questions whether forgetting, and turning
‘antagonists into consumers’, offers the best route to reconciliation.99
Titanic Belfast is the glamorous centrepiece of Titanic Quarter. The strik-
ing bow-shaped stainless steel building looms large in Belfast’s publicity
literature. Identifying the ‘key benefits’ for Belfast, a 2008 report empha-
sized the opportunities for ‘increased civic pride’ and ‘increased community
integration through the creation of Titanic Belfast as a neutral shared
space’.100 Titanic Belfast was constructed with public-sector financial help
amounting to almost eighty percent of total costs.101 Opened amid ‘frantic
fanaticism’ surrounding the centenary of the Titanic’s sinking, the visitor
centre (note, not museum) captured international press attention.102 The
then First and Deputy First Ministers of Northern Ireland, Peter
Robinson and Martin McGuinness, formally opened Titanic Belfast in
March 2012. In a speech to the assembled press corps, McGuinness
stated: ‘these buildings. . .are being used to write a new history, a better
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history’.103 The political undercurrents driving Titanic Belfast were never
more clearly articulated. Writing a ‘new history’ meant, by implication,
discarding the old.
The exhibition galleries at Titanic Belfast have received particularly fierce
academic censure. David Coyles has argued that failure to grapple with
shipyard sectarianism and acknowledge Protestant cultural links to H&W
amounts to a ‘censoring of history’.104 The spectre of conflict is absent,
sacrificed in order to create a new ‘commercial memoryscape’.105 Rodney
Harrison reminds us that ‘heritage is primarily not about the past, but in-
stead about our relationship with the present and the future’.106 ‘Heritage
memory’ anticipates a desired historical consciousness that has yet to ma-
terialize. Titanic Belfast serves this purpose, by selectively enlisting certain
themes and jettisoning others. Similarly, discussions of deindustrialization
and the impact of shipyard redundancies on East Belfast are entirely absent.
Indeed, such narrow focus on Titanic serves to ‘obscure the processes of
historical change’ more broadly, something that afflicts many industrial
heritage sites.107 While labour techniques are discussed, and the ordinary
worker foregrounded, the latter’s narratives remain oddly obscure, as if
hiding in plain sight. Paul Devlin has argued that the overall effect has
been to ‘de-narrate working-class experiences and heritage’.108 Titanic
Belfast is not unique in this respect. Beamish Museum in North East
England has been criticized for portraying coalfield communities as a
‘people without politics’.109 Titanic Belfast explains the fate of the ship,
but not that of the shipyard. 1912 is both year zero, and the chronological
end-point of historical analysis.
More broadly, academics have condemned what they see as the ‘shame-
less monetization’ associated with Titanic Quarter. ‘Publicly’, argue Stephen
Brown and colleagues, ‘nobody wants to rock the boat. Show me the
money is the only show in town’.110 While this might be true of political
and business leaders, working-class communities in East Belfast have been
vocal in their condemnation. H&W is an important marker of East Belfast
Protestant identity despite its much-diminished economic value to this com-
munity.111 Shipyard labour aided constructions of the working-class
Protestant sense of self, and remains a source of pride. In current popular
debates, Protestants are criticized for having too narrow a sense – or a
complete lack – of culture and identity.112 Cultural ownership of the ship-
yard and Queen’s Island has been removed from this community.
Intriguingly, however, oral history criticism of Titanic Belfast has argued
not that it has been ‘decommissioned as a Protestant space’, but that it is
divorced from labour skills and identity.113
Titanic Belfast was viewed by most ex-shipyard interviewees as inauthen-
tic and too narrowly focused. Several narrators expressed discontent at its
reliance on virtual reality interpretation. Dependency on digital aids and
immersive experiences (such as Titanic Belfast’s indoor cable-car ride
around a virtual reality slipway) is typical of the ‘experiential complex’ of
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late-modern museum sites.114 For ex-H&W workers, the craft element of
skilled shipyard trades is an important missing component. Maurice Davies,
a former H&W storeroom worker, opined ‘what I would love to have seen
was, if they’d kept a couple of original sheds like the blacksmiths or the
joiners, and they would have people – like in the Folk Park in Omagh –
doing traditional crafts’.115 Ex-H&W manager, and local historian, Tom
McCluskie echoed this sentiment:
What saddens me is that the heritage we had has gone. The Engine
Works have gone. The yards themselves have gone. The history is
gone. It’s only a facsimile now of what was left. I wanted to keep the
infrastructure – certain parts of it – so people could come along, later
generations and see how the men did the thing. If you go to Titanic
Belfast you get a Disneyesque view of it, and it’s not accurate. . . But I
don’t feel proud of what I see down here because it’s not right. It’s not a
tribute to the skills of the people who made Harland & Wolff what it
was.116
The performative and commodifying impulse of heritage has also pro-
duced dissonance. Titanic Belfast employs Edwardian-costumed guides to
convey the ‘authorized heritage discourse’, loosely based on shipyard anec-
dotes.117 (Fig. 3) During regeneration planning stages, consultations ‘high-
lighted the opportunity for ex-shipyard workers to be trained and employed
as curators/guides who will be able to provide a valuable insight for visitors
into life as a ship builder in more recent times or recount older stories of
Titanic and the city’.118 This has not occurred. Discussing a recent visit to
Titanic Quarter, Fred Hoskins, a former shipyard painter, powerfully
described his unwillingness to have his memories recycled for tourist con-
sumption, and the feeling that Titanic Belfast offers sanitized history:
The guy who manages it come over and said: ‘Did you work down here?’
I said: ‘Aye’. ‘Did you work in that [Hamilton dry] dock?’ ‘Yes’. He says:
‘I’ll bring you this girl – would you tell her what happened down there?’
I said: ‘Who’s this?’ ‘Well she’s a tour guide. She’ll be able to tell all the
tourists’. ‘Fuck off.’ You know? Fuck off. There’s no way you’ll get those
memories that cheap. You know? There’s no way. What’s missing down
there is – and I don’t particularly want to do it – I’m not looking for
jobs down there, you know, me with the cap on, sort of: ‘What about ye’.
Because that’s what they’re looking for down there. . . ‘Top of the morn-
ing to you, sir’. You know? ‘Back in 1912’. You know? I’m seeing things,
there’s a tour now where you take people round the houses in East
Belfast, you know, and they’re bringing them round as part of the ship-
yard tour. ‘This is where they used to live’. They’re not going to tell you
about the woman who was beat to a fucking pulp by her husband who
come home on a Friday night because she didn’t have her make-up on.
History Workshop Journal238
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/hw
j/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/hw
j/dbz003/5364617 by guest on 18 D
ecem
ber 2019
Fig. 3. Edwardian-costumed guide presents a ‘living history’ talk for ex-shipyard workers
at Titanic Hotel’s opening event. Author’s photo, September 2017.
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That’s what’s missing. The raw, hard edge of Harland & Wolff is missing.
It’s a sugar cake effect down there, you know?119
Fred described his feelings with considerable passion; the incident had evi-
dently been playing on his mind for some time. His comments expose the
dilemma faced by former shipyard workers: their memories, if they are to be
heard, require filtration and dissemination through Titanic Belfast. Fred’s
desire for a ‘hard edge’ to be incorporated into heritage interpretations
would, he feared, be compromised by Titanic Belfast guides who would
narrate ‘softer’, uncritically nostalgic performances. Fred adopted silence
to combat his powerlessness.
Ex-shipyard workers’ perceptions of Titanic Quarter are not universally
negative. Narrators who had prospered, rather than struggled, after indus-
trial redundancy tended to express more positive viewpoints. In contrast
to Fred, who was paid off suddenly in 1996, Jim Thompson, a former
draughtsman, left the company willingly in 1989 and enrolled at Bible
College. Jim, who went on to work as a Protestant minister for many
years, reflected:
I think it’s amazing what has actually happened and what has actually
taken place. I think I would have liked to have seen more happening, you
know, more taking place?. . . It’s even hard now to recognize – even where
we’re sitting now in PRONI [Public Records Office of Northern Ireland]
– that this is where the Engine Works actually was, where I actually used
to work. . .You can’t live in the past, you know? We’ve moved on. The
shipbuilding industry as it was will never be the same again.120
Jim, though proud to have worked for H&W, seemed content that Belfast’s
shipbuilding era had ended and saw Titanic Quarter as a means of respect-
fully ‘moving on’. Yet even in his more positive assessment the sense that the
pace of spatial change is unsettling is noticeable, as is his acknowledgement
that more needs to ‘happen’ before he considers regeneration a success.
Some nationalists too, though far less culturally invested in H&W, feel
disenfranchized. Brian Feeney, an Irish News columnist, called Titanic
Belfast ‘an attempt to airbrush history’. Although he feels that ‘nationalist
Belfast has no connection with the Titanic’, he contends that ‘most people
have just kept quiet because they are aware of the attempt to create a new
Belfast, attract visitors, tourists and all the rest of it’.121 In some ways,
negative consensus about deficiencies at Titanic Quarter has emerged
among Protestants and Catholics alike. Both communities feel that heritage
offerings do not speak to them. Asked if he saw himself reflected in Titanic
Belfast, ex-welder Michael Hague stated: ‘I don’t even see why a tourist
would go to it because what does it actually represent, you know?. . . Do
something beneficial instead of ripping people off and charging £14 to go up
and down an escalator’.122 The issues of representation and working-class
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socio-economic benefits are captured in this response. Titanic Belfast alien-
ates on multiple levels.
Created in 2008, Titanic Foundation Limited (TFL) is a charitable trust
with the aim of cultivating Titanic Quarter as a maritime destination and
facilitating social outreach. Titanic Belfast is accountable to TFL, which is
responsible for discharging some of the local community engagement duties
that the tourist-orientated Titanic Belfast fails to deliver. In their tenth
anniversary report, TFL acknowledged that ‘more needs to be done to re-
animate the public realm’ and highlighted the ‘risk that the destination is
regarded as an expensive tourist spot and not for locals’. TFL also recognize
the need to capture intangible heritage through the medium of oral history,
and not just concern itself with material artefacts. ‘We must continue’, the
report insists, ‘to engage with these communities to capture these stories
before it is too late.’123 However oral narratives rarely align with the
Titanic Quarter ethos and are often highly critical of the project and direc-
tion. Having completed a brief internship with TFL in 2015, I got the im-
pression that sustained engagement with community groups came a distant
second to development of the Titanic Quarter destination brand. But only
by listening and acting upon discontents can sceptical narratives and per-
ceptions be challenged.
The only substantial shipyard building to survive the wrecking ball in the
early 2000s was the former H&W Main Offices. Vacant and decaying since
abandonment in 1989, the Main Offices reopened with generous Heritage
Lottery Fund support (secured by TFL) as Titanic Hotel in September 2017.
The transformation of the Main Offices into Titanic Hotel captures some
quintessential heritage tensions. Economic repurposing of this last authentic
nineteenth-century H&W structure was the only viable alternative to its
demolition, but the exact form of the repurposing is deeply contested. Ex-
shipyard workers felt that opportunities missed in Titanic Belfast could in-
stead be fulfilled by the Main Offices. Brian Lister, who worked in the
building in the 1980s, protested:
They’ve those two massive Victorian drawing offices crying out to be a
maritime history museum. We’re the only UK city with a maritime his-
tory that doesn’t have a fucking museum. There are maritime history
museums in places that don’t have maritime history!124
Again, oral testimony suggests that history – as ex-shipyard workers see it –
has been sacrificed at the brand Titanic altar. Former welder Michael Hague
expressed this in particularly strong terms: ‘They’ve went in and they’ve
raped and pillaged in that place, make no mistake about that. People
have went in and took away the history’.125
Titanic Hotel invited around two dozen ex-H&W employees to the open-
ing ceremony. (Fig. 3) The feelings of ex-workers, captured in my field-notes
at the time, exposes the collision between ‘heritage memory’ and social
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memory, and the disorientating effects of navigating gentrified post-indus-
trial space. The public areas at Titanic Hotel, stripped back to their
Edwardian condition, were barely recognized by ex-shipyard workers. Ex-
workers were escorted around the building by a guide, and listened (rather
bemused) to two performances by costumed ‘living history’ actors recount-
ing the atmosphere at H&W during the days after the Titanic’s sinking. The
tour ended with an inspection of a £350 per night suite. In my field notes,
I wrote:
The view from the suite was one of the [shipyard] cranes and a deindus-
trial wasteland, and the Lower Newtownards beyond. (Fig. 4) Perhaps
this hotel represents the most vivid illustration of middle-class ‘ruin-
gazing’. Nowhere in the building was there reference to why the Main
Offices/Harlands reached this condition in the first place.126
History has been telescoped at Titanic Hotel, as with Titanic Quarter in
general.
Gentrification, writes Kirsteen Paton, ‘invites wider participation but
reproduces class inequality’.127 Middle-class cultural, economic and social
‘capital’, she argues, is ‘transmitted throughout [gentrifying] neighbour-
hoods’ and used as a tool to rescue ‘blighted’ areas, and cultivate ‘aspiration’
among post-industrial working-class communities.128 Yet working-class
consumers are often priced out and displaced by the very regeneration
that is supposed to benefit them. My field-notes also recorded my initial
reactions (and tensions therein) to the ‘heritagization’ and economic exclu-
sion evident at Titanic Hotel.
Demolition was the only alternative. It was a choice between complete
erasure or partial obscuring – the latter is the lesser of two evils. This is
probably the only time ex-workers can afford to stay/linger in the hotel.
The building has been gentrified beyond their financial limits.129
Ex-shipyard workers present at the opening echoed these sentiments. There
was gladness and sadness about the enterprise – gladness that the Main
Offices had been saved, but sadness that it did not properly reflect their
working lives. By historicizing the shipbuilding industry to 1912, Titanic
Hotel erases working-class social memory, in favour of clean – and com-
fortably distant – historical narratives. Gentrification secured the ‘new re-
wards’ of building preservation and aesthetic improvement, but brought
also ‘new injuries’ – namely conditionality of access, tied to economic
well-being, and narrow historical interpretation.130
CONCLUSION
Titanic Quarter has sought to circumvent Northern Ireland’s sectarian
divide and establish not only shared space but also shared history. Civic
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Fig. 4. View from Titanic Hotel suite, looking over the much-reduced H&W shipyard site towards
East Belfast. Author’s photo, September 2017.
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leaders and heritage professionals are engineering a new civic consciousness
for Belfast. By the same token they have ignored important tensions in the
social memory of shipbuilding. The bandwidth has been narrowed and
H&W’s contested history, explored here in conjunction with Titanic
Quarter redevelopment, has been sidestepped. But footfall and profit are
not the sole metrics of heritage success. Listening and acting upon the sen-
timents of ‘stakeholder’ communities is vital.131 Heritage is not abstract; it is
also the identity and history of individuals and communities. Titanic
Quarter – for understandable yet regrettable reasons – fails to register and
reflect social memory impulses. The result has been the construction of
cultural (and economic) barriers between heritage-makers and the commu-
nities they purport to reflect. A democratic deficit exists.
Steven High and Fred Burrill have recently called for public historians to
‘pick a side’: to be an agent of gentrification and the erasure of working-
class memory, or to pursue collaborative agendas which capture, reflect and
project lived experiences, and instil a sense of self-worth in communities
ruptured by deindustrialization.132 Industrial heritage museums are still,
troublingly, obsessed with industrialization and community stability,
rather than deindustrialization and transformation. Working-class people
‘can speak for themselves’ and curate heritage which they consider to be
important, and critically reflect on themes often absent in ‘official’ inter-
pretations.133 Spaces, places and narratives do not have to be ‘scrubbed
clean’ for tourist consumption.134 A good example of democratic heritage
and ‘emotional regeneration’ driven by (and for) deindustrializing working-
class communities is the Durham Miners’ Gala in the North-east of
England.135 At this annual gathering trade-union collectivism, community
spirit and international solidarity are celebrated, not least in the parading of
community funded banners.136 While heritage dissonance has not been com-
pletely eradicated, the Gala allows communities that have experienced the
trauma of ‘economic violence’ to reclaim a cultural sense of self.137 In con-
trast to Titanic Belfast, where interpretation has been centralized and sim-
plified, the Gala extends control to grassroots banner groups, and mobilizes
industrial heritage as a ‘resource for survival, and even a route out of the
dead end that deindustrialization has seemingly constructed’.138
To emotionally engage wider publics, Titanic Quarter requires ‘messy’
heritage that reflects lived experiences. As for the difficulties of ‘doing’
heritage and public history in Northern Ireland, interpretation need not be
blandly neutral. The Museum of Free Derry, for example, is unashamedly
partisan but has local (nationalist/republican) democratic accountability
and resonance.139 Enforced neutrality can stir deeper alienation, as this
article has highlighted.140 John Wilson Foster has argued, ‘it is hard
to gainsay or begrudge, at least for a time, a retreat from history into
heritage’.141 The result at Titanic Quarter is that far from challenging
bifurcated identities in Northern Ireland neutrality is entrenching them,
and deepening divides by social class. Against a backdrop of ongoing
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cultural, economic and social marginalization, it is time to reassess the
character and purpose of heritage and public history in Northern Ireland.
To quote Bill Rolston’s memorable conclusion: ‘The way to the future is
through remembering rather than enforced forgetting, through display
rather than whitewashing, through mature contestation rather than
bland reconciliation’.142
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